補助手段から武器へ -海軍軍用機の戦術的な役割に対する日本と英国の概念変遷、1910-1929- by Sun Wenzhu
 
From Auxiliary to Weapon: 
Japan and Britain’s Changing Understanding of the Naval 
Tactical Role of Aircraft, 1910-1929 
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Summary 
This article discusses how navies in Britain and Japan changed their 
understanding about the naval tactical role of aircraft in the 1910s and the 1920s. 
Introduced into both navies around 1910, aircraft was first seen as an auxiliary for 
supplementary tasks such as reconnaissance and spotting in naval operations. 
However, in practice, naval aviation pioneers of both countries found that the best 
use of aircraft is as a weapon to attack enemy vessels. The diffusion of such a new 
understanding in the two navies was conditioned by different organizational 
properties. In Japan, the close connection between naval centrals and aviation 
pioneers through committees and personnel shifts allowed aviation pioneers to 
promote their idea in the whole navy, and aircraft was explicitly accepted by the 
IJN as a weapon in 1928. However, similar pattern failed to complete in Britain 
after the independence of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1918, largely because 
organizational barriers established between naval aviation pioneers and naval 
centrals when most naval aviation pioneers left the RN to join the RAF, and then 
were neither allowed to take posts in the RN, nor to discuss their ideas about naval 
aircraft directly with their colleagues in the RN. Worsened the case was the RAF 
centrals’ unconcern about the naval use of air force, which ruled out the possibility 
for naval aviation pioneers to promote their new understanding about naval 
aviation within the RAF. Thus, the naval tactical role of aircraft as a weapon was 
not recognized in Britain through the 1920s, and even well into the 1930s. 
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1. Introduction 
Like many other military innovations, the process of integrating aviation into traditional 
naval fighting did not unfold evenly among countries at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Although Britain started relatively early in exploring the naval use of aircraft and 
possessed a most powerful naval air force by the end of WWI, she had become a straggler in 
this field by the beginning of WWII, especially when compared with Japan.  
Such a difference is a result of multiple factors including strategic issues, geopolitical 
locations, etc. However, in this article, I would like to limit the discussion within the realm 
of ideas. Since the use of military force is inseparable with the idea about how it should be 
used, 1  such a reversal cannot be sufficiently explained without a look at different 
understandings about the role of aircraft in a future naval war in both countries. The 
difference was obvious: when the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) officially accepted that 
aircraft should be used as a weapon to “attack the hostile main fleet in assistance of friendly 
fleet” in The Third Revision of Principles in Naval Operations issued in 1928,2 the attitude 
of the British Royal Navy (RN) towards whether aircraft should primarily be used to attack 
or to reconnoiter was ambiguous in the 1925 doctrine book The Naval War Manual, and 
such ambiguity continued into doctrine books issued in the 1930s.3 
By using a historical approach, this article tries to shed light on the processes of changing 
understanding about the optimal tactical role of naval aircraft in both countries. The 
processes demonstrate that, military organizations seldom learn new technologies as a 
whole. Instead, they tend to begin with sending a small group of pioneers, who learn the 
technology and form their rational understanding about it through largely autonomous 
practices. Later, the small group try to spread their understanding into the whole 
organization. The effectiveness of military innovations is a result of the smoothness of 
ideational exchange channels between the group of pioneers and the original organization.  
In the following sections, I will first review related literature, and then analyze how navies 
in Japan and Britain learnt about the tactical role of aircraft by dividing such processes in 
two stages. New understanding about naval aviation started to appear in the first stage, and 
went on for diffusion in the second. Archives, memoirs, historical works and other first and 
second materials will be used. Conclusions come at the end. 
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2. Literature Review 
Military innovation as a concept has been discussed by many scholars. Successful military 
innovation normally means effective mobilization and strengthening of national power. 
However, who should take credit for the success? Barry Posen argues that military 
organizations come with a need for certainty and institutionalization, which impede 
innovation until pushed, usually by some sensible civilian leader who feels the pressure of 
unfavorable security conditions.4 On the contrary, Stephen Rosen holds that innovations are 
more likely to be promoted by senior officers within military with new ideas and the power 
to promote them. 5 Harvey Sapolsky argues that interservice rivalry causes competition for 
resources, thus may spur one service to work efficiently and facilitate military innovation.6 
Such and argument is concurred by Owen Cote, who demonstrates that interservice conflict 
is “a powerful and independent source of innovative military doctrine.” and interservice 
cooperation is more likely to suffocate innovations.7 Nonetheless, Rod Coffey and Michael 
McNerney argues that interbranch politics may block innovation and interservice 
cooperation is needed to innovate. 8 
Apparently, the cases of military innovations are too varied and complicated to be 
generally covered by a few theoretical models, which also makes it crucial to comb through 
the specific processes of these cases. On the pre-WWII developments of naval aviation in 
Japan and Britain, researchers have argued that difference in paces of innovation could be 
explained by strategic factors such as the enduring economic difficulties9 and distracting 
multiple security threats10  faced by Britain; organizational factors such as the independence 
of the British Royal Air Force, which deprived the RN of future “air minded” senior naval
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University Press, 2007, pp158-185 
91
officers and caused the marginalization of naval aviation in both services, 11 and in contrast, 
as the concentration and autonomy of naval aviation management in Japan, marked by the 
establishment of an “independent naval air headquarters”. 12 
However, these explanations are less than sufficient. The differences in  strategic 
environment cannot explain why the  scarcity of resource did not incent Britain to pursue 
more effective military methods (like naval air power) to protect her interests, which proved 
essential for dealing with  her threats both in the Far East and in Europe. 13  The 
establishment of the IJN Naval Aviation Department () in 1927 only “explains 
the impressive surge in the development of Japanese naval aviation from the mid-1930s”, 14 
but does not explain the constant development of Japanese naval aviation from the 1910s to 
the 1920s. Meanwhile, the ideational side of the development of naval aviation has not 
received enough attention. Naval doctrines during the interwar period in both countries 
were depicted as stably dominated by Mahanism which claims the guns of battleships as the 
core of naval power, and the attitudes towards naval aviation only “differed in the degree”.15  
But historical researches indicates that change in ideas towards naval aircraft did exist.16 
And in order to explain the difference in paces of adopting naval aircraft in both navies 
better, a detailed look into the processes in which understanding about the role of naval 
aviation changed is necessary. In other words, we need to know, who said what on naval 
aviation, and when? 
 
3. Aviation Pioneers and the Formation of New Understanding 
3.1 Introducing Aviation into the IJN: 1909-1916 
In March 1909, the IJN as an organization learnt about aircraft for the first time from a 
Lieutenant Commander Yamamoto Eisuke. As a staff officer of the 2nd Department (dept. of 
armament) in Naval General Staff, Yamamoto sent a proposal to his director, in which he 
argued that the IJN should start researching about aviation as soon as possible since 
aircraft was potential to “become the ‘warship in the air’ with great combat capability, 
exerting its awesome power”17. 
Receiving interest from the leadership in the 2nd Department and later Naval Minister 
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Saito Makoto, this proposal led to the establishment of a military-naval joint Temporary 
Military Balloon Research Committee (CDEFG%H) in July, 190918  and finally an 
Aviation Research Committee (ARC) (I%JKH) owned by the IJN in June, 
1912.19  
As the only aviation related institution in the IJN at that time, the ARC was given only 
broad directions like researching on “aircraft manipulation”, “standards of naval military 
aircraft” and “other things about aviation”. 20  Led by the Director General of the 2nd 
Department Captain Yamaji Kazuyoshi 21  and staffed by some young IJN officers with 
enthusiasm on aviation including Lt. Kaneko Yozo, who flew the very first Japanese naval 
flight later,22 the ARC had to decide what to do by itself.  
It seems that Capt. Yamaji and his fellows started from exploring what could be done by 
aircraft. The research topics for 1913 included “long-distance aviation, reconnaissance, 
communication, selecting carrier, dropping bombs, machine guns for aircraft” which should 
be “conducted sequentially”.23 In 1913, the ARC also conducted an unsuccessful gun-spotting 
exercise showing that spotting task could only be fulfilled with much more advanced 
technologies in aviation and communication. 24 In March 1914, after a 6-month mission 
around Europe and America, Capt. Yamaji gave a talk about naval aircraft in the naval club 
“Suikoukai (???)”, saying that the naval utility of aircraft could be “reconnaissance, 
following and bombing against submarines”, “warning about sea-mines”, “reconnaissance 
over the sea and above hostile ports” and “menacingly bombing hostile ports”.25  
These tasks were only partly tested in the soon coming belligerence. In the autumn of 
1914, a temporary “Naval Air Group” was made with ARC members to participate in the 
Battle of Qingdao against Germany. Like their previous practices, the “Naval Air Group” 
conducted reconnaissance and bombing. The task finished with neither major accidents nor 
groundbreaking accomplishments.26  
A more clear understanding about the tactical role of aircraft appeared among the aviation 
                                                     
18 ibid. 
19 
LMJKH1969$
 NOP(DQRST7, 10 
20 U%$VWXY
Z(5[\]^_] 127 
21 ibid. 
22 
LMJKH1969$
 E`P(DQRST54 ab<cd1944$

e(fg@h41 
23=i 2& 6jkl m 18 >Q 3I%Hn1o#JACARnpqpr
sZtuvwoRef. C08020254500
nU%o 
24=i 2& 6jkl m 18 >Q 3xyz{|n1o#JACARnpqpr
sZtuvwoRef. C08020254800n
U%o 
25 }~H$}~HQ(1914  12 1 12-16 
26 b<cd$
e(25-30 
93
pioneers in January 1916, when Capt. Yoshida Kiyokaze, chairman of the AMC at that time, 
submitted a report to the Naval Minister. After reviewing the short history and status quo 
of—or in other words, summarizing all the Japanese knowledge about—naval aviation, the 
report put that “aircraft should not only be used for reconnaissance, but also for attacks 
gradually in the future”27 as one of its lessons learnt. It was for the first time that such 
understanding of the combat role of naval aviation was stated formally and clearly. 
With the Imperial Diet’s approval, the ARC was transformed into the first air group in the 
IJN -the Yokosuka Naval Air Group()- on Apr. 1st, 1916. Just a few days 
before, Capt. Yamauchi Shiro, a senior member of the AMC and the first commander of this 
new air group, had submitted a report about his inspective trip on aviation around Europe 
and America, which also summarized that bombing should be the primary function of 
aircraft.28 
From June 1912 to March 1916, the ARC nurtured the first batch of aviation professional 
officers for the IJN, providing the IJN with qualified staff officers on aviation issues, and 
instructors that trained those who further changed Japanese naval aviation later. 
Meanwhile, including Capt. Yamaji and Lt. Cdr. Yamamoto, a few staff officers in the Naval 
Ministry and Naval General Staff also became familiar with aviation. These two small 
groups of people composed the aviation pioneers in the IJN. With a belief in aircraft’s 
potential against surface vessels,29 they were to play an essential role in promoting such an 
understanding in the whole navy.  
 
3.2 RN’s First Knowledge about Aviation: 1907-1918 
In Britain, although the RN had an encounter with aviation earlier than the IJN, it had 
not paid much attention to this new technology. In 1907, the Admiralty showed disinterest 
toward Wright Brothers’ “flying machine”.30 Three years later, RN eventually accepted the 
offer of a civilian pilot named Frank McClean to gratis train four naval officers to fly, which 
received more than 200 applications from naval officers.31 In February 1912, the Royal Navy 
opened the Eastchurch Flying School commanded by Samson, one of the four trainees.32 
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Staff of that school also composed the Naval Wing of a new “Royal Flying Corps” established 
by the decision of the Committee of Imperial Defence.33 
In August 1912, on accepting the appointment of Director of Aviation Department recently 
established within the Admiralty, 34 Capt. Murray Sueter predicted 8 duties of the naval 
wing, indicating that it had been impossible to predict exactly what aircraft could best do at 
this stage. Capt. Sueter’s list was topped by “distant reconnaissance with the fleet” and 
“reconnaissance of enemy coasts from detached cruisers or special aeroplane ships”, while 
tasks related to attack and defense came at the end.35 In the Royal Navy annual maneuver 
in 1913, aircraft participated for the first time, focusing on reconnaissance. 36  
Just like what happened in Japan, the Naval Wing first started with some experimental 
work. According to a supervising report issued in June 1913, such experimental work had 
been dealing with engines, wireless telegraphy, control of naval aeroplanes, bomb-dropping, 
launching torpedoes, firing practice and inspection of aircraft construction.37 As the WWI 
was approaching, pioneer aviators proposed for exercises with aircraft attacking 
submarine,38 experimented to destroy German Zeppelins in the air, “to devise a bomb sight”, 
to learn “the effects on an aircraft of the release of a 100-lb. bomb” and “the consequences of 
flying over an explosion”, to detect submarines and to devise deep bombs against them.39 On 
March 19th, 1914, Sueter recommended to build a torpedo carrying seaplane. 40  Such 
flexibility resulted in the multiple tasks including air patrol and air defence/attack allocated 
to the new air service when the hostility commenced.  
However, British naval aviators learnt more from WWI than their Japanese colleagues. In 
the autumn of 1914, after finishing a job of providing support for a Royal Marine brigade 
sent to hold Antwerp, the ardent Cdr. Samson and his squadron (later renamed Royal Naval 
Air Service, or RNAS) decided to stay in the frontline41 and finally extracted an order from 
the Admiralty requiring them to preventively defend Britain against Zeppelins and 
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submarines.42 According to this, air raids against Zeppelin bases were conducted. 
Bombing remained on the task list of Cdr. Samson. In Feb. 1915, he sent a letter to the 
Admiralty asking for “a large number of aeroplanes” “with speed of about 90 miles per hour 
or more, and carrying 300 lb. weight of bombs”. He believed that “bomb-dropping is only 
successful at the present moment when carried out by aeroplanes carrying a number of 
bombs”, and it was best to keep a load of bombing at the ports of Dunkirk so that 
submarines would not be able to use them.43 Later in the Dardanelles, an RNAS officer 
conducted the first successful aircraft torpedo attack against a vessel in history.44  
Bombing also became a topic in the Admiralty. Minutes of a conference among Churchill 
(the First Lord) and several aviation pioneers (now occupants of crucial posts in the RNAS) 
on 3rd April 1915 showed that “aeroplanes and seaplanes” for the duty of “bomb dropping 
and offensive raids generally” appeared on the top of the agenda, followed by 
“reconnaissance” and “spotting for gun fire”.45 The faith in bombing continued even after the 
failure of the operations in the Dardanelles.46 At the end of 1915, with the new torpedo 
aircraft available, Sueter produced a paper to advocate that these new machines “would 
have a similar potential to transform naval warfare as the tank had done with warfare on 
land” by attacking hostile fleets in group from a distanced base. Regrettably, Sueter’s plan 
did not work because of bad weather and the problems of these new aircraft. 47 
Even in the post-Churchill disturbances in the Admiralty surrounding the administration 
of the RNAS, there still seemed a silver lining of the Royal Navy accepting the role of 
aircraft as a weapon. In 1916, answering to the query of the Joint War Air Committee, the 
RNAS listed five major tasks “such as can best be carried out by personnel with naval 
training”, first of which was “to attack the enemy’s fleets, dockyards, arsenals, factories, air 
sheds, etc., from the coasts, whether the coasts be the enemy’s or our own (i.e. long-distance 
bombing),” followed by patrol, gunfire spotting, scouting, and assisting the Army.48 In fact, 
such statements were rather close to actual functions of naval aircraft in WWII. In August, 
1917, the Assistant Director of  Air Services, Wing Captain A.V. Vivyan, who had been the 
first commander of the first British seaplane carrier HMS Hermes, drafted a report asking 
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for “three types of aircraft to operate with the fleet: reconnaissance, fighters and torpedo 
bombers, with different carriers for each type”. He recommended the newest and fastest 
aircraft carrier, once commissioned, to carry bombers and to operate with the fleet.49 In 
September, Admiral Beatty, C-in-C of the Grand Fleet, asked the Admiralty for a “heavy air 
attack on the High Sea Fleet with 120 of the new torpedo bombers launched from eight 
carriers”.50 Though these calls were not fully supported by the Admiralty, it was clear which 
direction the British naval aviation would be heading. 
   
4. Diffusion of New Understanding in Two Navies??
4.1 Japan: Intercommunications between the Aviation Pioneers and Naval Centrals 
In Japan, the understanding that aircraft should be used as a weapon, which was 
commonly held in naval aviation pioneers, had been successfully diffused to the whole IJN 
through intercommunications between aviation pioneers and naval centrals. There were two 
ways of these intercommunications, one was through committees who participated by 
members of these two groups, and the other was aviation pioneers joining the naval centrals 
through personnel shifts.  
First, in order to better understand the aircraft, the IJN organized several informal 
committees since 1917. Aviation pioneers participated actively in these committees, and 
most decisions taken by these committees agreed that aircraft should best be used as a 
weapon.  
For example, in November 1917, a Temporary Investigative Committee on Submarine and 
Aircraft Affairs (TICSA, CD}H) was established in response to a report of 
the Director General of the 1st Dept. (department of operations) of the Naval General Staff, 
which argued that due to the rapid technological progress in Europe since the Great War 
had broken out,  a unified research & planning institution on submarine and aircraft affairs 
under the direction of the Naval Minister should be established as soon as possible.51 The 
research topics of the TICSA on aviation included organization, equipment, personnel 
training, “offensive/defensive methods” and “other necessary issues”.52 
Seen from the name list remaining, aviation pioneers played a critical role in the 
committee. Capt. Yamauchi and Cdr. Kaneko were both “full-time members” of the 
committee’s aviation department. The TICSA produced 8 reports on aviation in total. A 
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report on aircraft carrier pointed out that the most essential quality of aircraft carriers 
should be the ability to carry as many aircraft as possible, and attack aircraft should be 
most often carried on the carrier.53 Another report in October 1918 proposed that two-thirds 
of the aircraft production should be undertaken by civilian enterprises instead of military 
factories so that the quantitative need of aircraft could be met.54 Seen from the emphasis on 
the number of aircraft, the thought hold by Capt. Yamauchi and Cdr. Kaneko that aircraft 
should be primarily used as weapon55 was likely to be accepted by other members in the 
TICSA. 
Aviation members in TICSA also promoted for setting up aviation related institutions in 
naval central authorities. Their wish list included a separate branch in the Bureau of 
Military Affairs (BMA), a naval aviation department which answers to the Naval Minister 
directly, and a Cdr./Lt.Cdr. staff officer in Naval General Staff. 56 Although the latter two on 
the list had to wait until 1927 and 1922, the first came true in July 1919 when the TICSA 
was dismissed and separated to two temporary branches of BMA on aviation and submarine 
respectively. 57  With the autonomy of this new born Branch of Aviation, Lt.Cdr. Oseki 
Takamaro submitted a report in June 1919, arguing that “Aviation force of the IJN should 
participate in fleet battles as a critical part cooperating with capital ships by directly 
attacking the enemy fleet.”58 
Another example of such committees was the Naval Aviation Investigative Committee
H ) established in 1923 to “better coordinate the administration, operation, 
technology and other areas of aviation” and “provide solutions for aviation related 
problems”. Chaired by a rear admiral with full seniority, this committee was staffed with 
naval officers from key naval central departments, as well as Oseki and some pioneer 
aviators. 59 With “fierce debating at every group review”60, this committee made the critical 
decision to conduct bombing experiments against an old battleship Iwami in August 1923, 61 
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an attempt to test the new American findings that aircraft could bombard and sink 
battleships, which caught the eye of many in Japan, 62 by the IJN itself. The experiment was 
conducted in July 1924 with the endeavors of the whole IJN, receiving much attention.63 
With the battleship sunk with less ammunition than expected and the hit rate flat 
comparing with that of other navies and the IJN’s previous training, results of the 
experiment did support pioneer aviator Lt.Cdr. Matsunaga Toshio, one of its participants’ 
persuasive argument that the aircraft had shown potential to become an important naval 
weapon in the future, and more naval resource should be invested in it. 64  
Second, besides participating committees, aviation pioneers in IJN also had other chances 
to take posts in naval centrals. For example, Yamauchi had once led the Aircraft Section of 
the Naval Technological Department; Kaneko had also worked in the Naval Ministry and 
the Naval College. Lt.Cdr. Matsunaga himself had been transferred to the BMA in June, 
1926, and two months later, the BMA listed “bombing and torpedo dropping by aircraft” in 
the Plan of Naval Drill 1926 as a separate program for the first time.65 The performance of 
aircraft in the drill also supported the decision to set up a Naval Aviation Department in 
1927.66 ?
From 1925, torpedo bombing emerged as a training subject for the Yokosuka Naval Air 
Group.67 Seen from the training subjects issued every year from 1927, the air arm of the IJN 
worked on tactical aspects including firing, bombing, torpedo-bombing, reconnaissance, 
maintenance, etc. The hit rate of bombing and torpedo bombing was a constant focus.68 In 
1928, an IJN official doctrine book, The Third Revision of Principles in Naval Operations 
defined the aim of naval air operations as “attack the hostile main fleet in assistance of 
friendly fleet”,69 marking the acceptance of aircrafts’ combat role in the whole IJN.  
 
4.2 Britain: Organizational Barriers and Stagnated Change 
Unlike what happened in Japan, the independence of the Royal Air Force in April, 1918 
resulted in barriers for the intercommunications between naval aviation pioneers and the 
naval centrals. First, since most naval aviation pioneers left the RN for the RAF, they were 
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not possible to participate in the work of the naval centrals. Second, since the RAF central 
was not interested in the naval use of air force, naval aviation pioneers could neither 
promote their new understanding about using aircraft as a weapon within the RAF. Third, 
RAF leadership also confined the naval aviation pioneers in the RAF from direct 
interchange with the naval central, making them unable to promote their new 
understanding in the RN. Thus, the understanding about the new tactical role of naval 
aircraft failed to be diffused.   
From the establishment of the RAF on Apr. 1st 1918, the management of naval aviation 
had been split between the new service and the Royal Navy. Naval aircraft and most 
aviators belonged to the RAF Coastal Area, to which a few naval officers were “seconded” as 
pilots or observers in order to provide the Royal Navy with some basic knowledge about 
aviation. In the Admiralty, there remained only a very small Naval Air Section.70 
In 1924, the Fleet Air Arm (ship-based aircraft) was established within the RAF Coastal 
Area (renamed as Coastal Command in1936) and the Royal Navy was allowed to provide for 
70% of its pilots and all the observers, while the aircraft was provided by and thus belonged 
to the RAF. However, for almost a decade the highest rank an FAA naval aviator could reach 
was lieutenant, commanding normally 6 aircraft, a post too junior to gain enough vision on 
how best to use aircraft operationally, not to say strategically.71  
The majority of naval aviation pioneers who went to the new service including Samson 
and Vivyan soon found that the Air Staff was not considering much about using aircraft for 
naval purposes. Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of the Air Staff from 1919 to 1930, 
was more interested in strategic bombing of industrial centers 72  and insisted on the 
“ubiquity” of the air service.73 The Deputy Chief of Air Staff provided by the Royal Navy at 
the beginning of the new service, ex-RAdm. Mark Kerr, who had supported the 
independence of the RAF for the value of aircraft in anti-submarine duties, left the post for 
an RAF Area Command in April 1918 because of “certain differences on matters of strategy 
with the Chief of the Staff ”74 and soon retired. Ex-Fifth Lord Godfrey Paine, the other 
crucial figure in the Air Council from the Royal Navy, remained Master General of 
Personnel, held but limited responsibilities, and “the remainder of the Council did not 
recognize that anti-submarine warfare was of the first importance for the safety of our 
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communications and supplies”.75 
It was neither easy for naval aviation to find representation in the Naval Staff, in which a 
small new Naval Air Section(single staffed for six months) was established and headed by 
the only pioneer aviator who remained in the Royal Navy, Richard Bell Davies. However, his 
work was under the close supervision of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff and with little 
autonomy. 76 His attempt to cooperate with RAF Coastal Area raised protest from the Air 
Council as trespass, 77  then banned with the concurrence of RN centrals and the 
reaffirmation from the Prime Minister in 1926.78 
Moreover, Davies himself was not as passionate as his Japanese counterparts in the value 
of naval aircraft. On the bombing trials conducted by the RN and the RAF against the 
battleship Agamemnon in 1923, Davies was unwilling to accept the idea that aircraft may 
destroy battleships, since such a situation would severely deteriorate the security 
surroundings of Britain and reduce the value of the RN fleet in national defense against 
land-based German aircrafts.79 In his remarks, the trials were less arbitration between 
bombs and battleships than a message to the public about the unlikeness of saving defense 
expenditures by replacing battleships with aircrafts.80 Thus, though the results of these 
trials were similar to those in in Japan and the United States, 81 they received much colder 
reactions in Britain and did not lead to a major shift in the Royal Navy’s understanding of 
aircraft. 
In summary, although the naval aviation pioneers in Britain formed the new idea that 
aircraft should be used as a weapon to attack in their practices, the organizational barrier 
established between most naval aviation pioneers and the naval leadership after the 
independence of the RAF blocked the new idea from being accepted by the whole navy.  The 
result could be seen from the Naval War Manual 1925, which mentioned “the strategic 
function of aircraft” equivocally as “independent operations against the enemy” but 
emphasized the “tactical functions of naval aircraft in naval battles” topped by 
reconnaissance.82 
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5. Conclusion  
This article tries to argue that in both countries, knowledge about the optimal tactical 
role of naval aircraft was first accumulated in a small group of “aviation pioneers”. In Japan, 
such new idea was successfully promoted by these pioneers to the whole navy through 
committees and personnel shifts. However, similar pattern failed to complete in Britain 
after the independence of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1918, largely because organizational 
barriers established between naval aviation pioneers who did know about the best use of 
naval aircraft and those in the RN centrals. 
At the very beginning of naval aviation, both the IJN and the Royal Navy organized a 
small branch of young officers to explore this new area, who gradually found that the 
primary role of aircraft in naval battles should be a weapon against hostile targets in their 
highly autonomic training, experiments and operations.  
In the IJN, such an idea was gradually promoted by these aviation pioneers and finally 
accepted. Japanese naval aviation pioneers participated actively in the process of related 
decision making through discussions and cooperation with officers of naval centrals. The 
connection between naval centrals and aviation pioneers was kept tight through 
institutional links and personnel shifts. Thus, despite the relative weakness of aircraft in 
the 1910s and the early 1920s, and the belief in battleships held by many IJN officers out of 
aviation area, aircraft was still accepted by the IJN as a weapon explicitly in 1928. 
In Britain, the understanding of aircraft as a naval weapon also started gradually 
diffusing from the aviation pioneers up to officers of naval centrals and commanders of naval 
forces. However, with the establishment of an independent air force, organizational barriers 
between the aviation pioneers and naval/air force centrals interrupted the communication of 
ideas and blocked the diffusion of new understanding. On one hand, naval centrals, who 
needed to know about the tactic role of naval aircraft, could not satisfyingly communicate 
with the aviation pioneers who did know about the situation. On the other hand, the RAF 
centrals who had access to naval aviation pioneers and the knowledge were not interested in 
the naval use of aircraft. Thus, the value of aircraft as a weapon at sea was blurred in both 
services. The new naval tactical role of aircraft was not recognized in Britain in the Naval 
War Manual 1925, not even in the Manual of Combined Operations 1938.83 
These similarities and differences in the process of understanding the role of aircraft in 
naval power indicate that the effectiveness of military organizations to learn new 
technologies is related to the properties of these organizations. Instead of learning new 
technologies as a whole, military organizations tend to begin learning with a small group of 
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autonomous pioneers, whose acquired knowledge taken into the whole organization later. 
With a smooth channel of ideational exchange between the group of pioneers and the 
original organization, military innovations would be more effective. 
 
nReceived 8th May, 2015o 
nAccepted 25th July, 2015o 
 
 
  
103
